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'THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS.

I. INTRODUCTORY.
In the public.discussions; literature and judicial decisions in
this country relating to the subjects of workmen's compensation
and social insurance it is often charged, asserted or implied that
the compensation laws of Europe rest solely upon economic and
sociological bases. And the inattention to-juridical p.rinciples
that has characterized the formulation of many of our American
compensation laws, has tended to confirm this error. Consequently there is need of a presentation here of some exposition
of the jurisprudence of those European laws. The task is rendered difficult by the differences in form assumed by those laws
and by the multitude of variations in their minor details. To
reduce the confusion from this cause, attention will be confined
to the laws of France, Great Britain, Germany and Austria, both
because of the relative industrial importance of those-countries
and because their laws present the four principal types of the
compensation law.
In historical order .the German compensation law comes
first. But for the purpose of this study it will be more cnlightening to take up first and in greatest detail the evolution of the law
in France, for the reason that, whereas in the other countries the
(823)
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change to the compensation law was comparatively sudden and
little discussed, in France it took place only after nearly twenty
years of parliamentary debates and popular discussion, in the
course of which the newer theories of responsibility and the
principles and motives of the new law were most completely
developed and most clearly presented.
The line of discussion in the following pages starts with the
objections to the former law of employer's liability, passes first
to the various juridical theories of responsibility proposed as the
basis for a substitute, next to an analysis of the principles of the
four compensation laws selected as typical, then to the economic
and sociological'theories more or less associated with those laws,
and finally concludes with the principal objections to them.
Early in the discussion will be presented the principles of the
juridical theory of responsibility for "trade risk"; and thereafter the points for consideration will be h6w far those principles
really underlie the compensation laws and how far they are sound
and expedient.
In an attempt to avoid prolixity main principles have been
emphasized and minor details and variations ignored, to an
extent that may appear. excessive. 'Access to some primary
sources of information, upon which the writer was depending
to complete the study of this subject, was shut off by the sudden
outbreak of the war. This fact must serve as an excuse for
some obvious imperfections and possible errors.'
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II.

THE LAW OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY

dX

DELICTO.

In all the four countries to which attention will be confined,
what for convenience may be called th- old law of employers'
liability for accidents to employees was approximately identical,
being based upon the principle of responsibility solely ex delicto.
In Germany, generally, and in Austria the employer was liable
only for his personal faults, including negligence in the selection
of his employees. 2 In France and the Rhenish States of Germany the employer was liable for his own personal faults and for
those of certain agents and agencies. In Great. Britain he was
liable for his own personal faults, and, under the principle of
respondeat sup:rior, for those of his employees, but subject to
the defences of assumption of 'isks, common employment and
contributory negligence. 4 In all of these countries the burden of
proof was upon the injured employee, and the: measure of liability was- full damages:
This body of law was the outgrowtli of the application to
the relation of employer and employee of the principles of the
Roman Law applicable between strangers. Because its principles
are thus ancient it is a common impression that the law in this
specific -application is likewise of long use. The contrary is the
fact. Dfiring Roman times and the Middle Ages the question
of occupational accidents did not arise.5 The relations between
masters and workmen were then generally governed by a law of
statics, and there was seldom any labor contract, in the modern
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sense of the term. It is sufficient to note without going into this
complex and historically obscure subject further, that until very
recent dates, indeed, generally, until well into the Nineteenth
Century, there were no "damage cases" between employers and
employees. Such cases arose only after a change had taken
place in the relations of employment, due principally to the development of modern forms of industry. Consequently, from the
practical standpoint, this branch of law is a very modern experiment, entirely out of harmony with the practices of the many
centuries that preceded its use.
In the first stage of the experinment the tribunals applied the
principles of this law with rigorous logic, requiring real personal
fault on the part of the. employer, really proved, as a condition
to the right of indenity. 6 The social results were deplorable.
On the one hand was the waste, delay and uncertainty of the
remedy and the pernicious hostility it developed between the
parties to the labor contract. On the other hand was the ever
growing army of destitute victims of -industrial accidents that it
dumped upon their helpless families and the public for support
and charitable relief. But the wrong was not all social. The
results soon came to be recognized to be unjust as between
master and man.
Consequently there succeeded a disposition on the part of
courts and legislatures to stretch the law to favor the workmen,
regardless of the logical consequences of its principles, while
ostensibly still adhering to those principles. The rules of proof
were relaxed, fictitious faults were presumed, faults of others
were imputed to employers, a relation of cause and effect between
the damage suffered and the fault alleged was blindly inferred,
and indefinite and impossible duties were imposed upon or attributed to employers for the sole purpose of creating of their
unavoidable non-compliance a novel category of factitious faults
to serve as a basis of liability.7 "It is by humane fictions that the
tribunals manage ingeniously to discover faults, or rather to
invent them, where there are none, just in order to give the
victims the right to indemnity."' s
' Sagot,

p. 15.
'Cf. Sagot. p. i5 ct seq.

' Cheysson. cit. Serre. p. 8.
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This process had not proceeded far-in Great Britain it had
,hardly started-before it was perceived by jurists that in its
operations the law was recklessly departing from its principles, 9
and that to keep within the limits of jurisprudence, it was necessary either to return to an honest application of those principles
or to discover some. new principle upon which to base -amore
extensive liability.
On the practical side also the results of this process were
recognized to be for the worse. The uncertainty and delay of
the relief were as great as ever, the economic waste and consequently the burden upon industry was multiplied, employers were
exasperated by the falseness of the charges upon which they were
being punished, and yet the g'in in relief to the workmen in the
aggregate was slight. Their chances in the gamble of litigation
were substantially increased, but they were still left to bear all
the loss from far the greater part of the mass "of accidents.
In Great Britain there grew up ain insistent demand for an
enlargement of the right to indemnity by abrogating the employers' defences, due to the fact that "the increase in the magnitude of private business undertakings, where the employer took
but small share in the actual management, and the establishment
of numerous companies with limited liability, where the employer
was merely an abstract personality, rendered the retention of
the doctrine of common employment a matter of great hardship
to the workmen."' 0 But compliance with this demand would
-have left fault still to be proved, and consequently would not
have much improved the position of the workmen, since the
largest category of accidents are not due to faults; and, on the
other hand, the justice of applying the principle of respondeat
superior to practically all wrongs corhmitted by employees against
one another in the course of their work was too generally denied
to be admissible.
Consequently it came to be appreciated in all four countries
that the theory of employers' responsibility solely ex delicto was
wrong.1 Legislatures and tribunals were empirically discarding
it piecemeal; and the public conscience was in revolt against its
'M orin, p. io.
" Ruegg, p. 37.
'Cf. Bouyer. pp. 127-A

828

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLIANIA LAW REVIEW

practical results. The selection of some other and broader
theory of responsibility was, therefore, in order.
But this law was subjected to other criticisms besides that
of its insufficiency, three of which are sufficiently relevant to be
noticed.
i. Intimately associated with- the English law of liability
solely e.r delicto is the doctrine of assumption of risks. This
doctrine is that in accepting employment the workman should
be presumed to have contracted to assume, first, all'the ordinary
and usual risks incidental thereto, and, secondly, all risks which
he knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care may know to
exist. The second branch of this doctrine supports the defence
of common employment, whereas the first, as it were, confirms
the justice of the theory of responsibility, only for fault. The
premises upon which this doctrine is based are that the workman
is free to accept or reject employment, and that wages are fixed
proportionately to the risk, so as to compensate for extraordinary
dangers. These premises are now known to be false;12 aid consequently the doctrine in question is generally recognized to be
unsound.13 So long as the principle of no liability without fault
prevailed, the collapse of this doctrine held out no prospect of
much improving the position of the workmen, since the necessity
of proving some kind of fault would still remain. But when
that principle came to be regarded as unconscionable in application to the relation of employer and employee, then the rejection
of the doctrine that the worknan may justly be presumed to have
contracted to assume the usual and ordinary risks of his employment naturally led to the question, whether sonic other and more
equitable contract as to those risks might not justly be presumed
or imputed. This question is answered by the doctrine of "trade
risk," which, as will be shown later, imputes a contract for an
equitable division of those risks.
2. In theory at least the law of liability e.r delicto uses the
proximate cause as the criterion of responsibility. But the cause
of an accident is the sum of the antecedent conditions that have
led up to its occurrence, and the selection among such conditions
U

Sagot, pp. io3-4; Bouyer, note pp. i$i-z

Ruegg, p. x6.
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of the proximate condition is almost purely arbitrary. 14 Industrial experience teaches that to adjudge responsibility for industrial accidents according to the proximate cause alone is unjust
as well as dangerous.- Consequently the. application of this
criterion cannot be uniformly just. Greater justice would be
effected by predicating partial liability upon responsibility for
any cause materially contributing to the occurrence. The relevancy of this conclusion will appear later, when we see that the
compensation laws base the employer's liability for partial reparation upon his responsibility for any risk in the chain of causation,.
not too remote to be material.
3. In practice the law of liability ex delicto so frequently
miscarries as to result in an utter travesty of justice according
to any theory.a-5 The principil cause thereof is that in appliciation to accidents occurring under the complex conditions of
modern industries, fault is a most radically unfit criterion of liability fbr practical use: (a) -Because "fault" is a term of most
uncertain and indefinite meaning when applied to concrete cases.
(b) Because the question of fault is peculiarly liable to incorrect
decision, through sympathy, prejudice or ignorance. (c) Because
in a large proportion of cases the facts upon which to predicate
a correct judgment are *practically unascertainable.1 6 (d) Because
in a yet larger proportion of cases they. are unascertainable by
judicial process. 17 (e) Because the expense and delay unavoidably incident to a determination by judicial process are so great
as indirectly to defeat justice in a majority of cases. Consequently, under some conditions at least, fault, as the sole criterion
of liability, must be rejected as an ineffective means for an
impracticable end.

tCf. Howe's "Studies in the Civil Law", 2d ed., pp. 295-7.
"Everywhere it is noticed that judges and active members of the legal
profession are the last to appreciate this phenomenon. Shut off from direct
observation of the physical facts, they are the slowest to realize the general
and radical disaccord betweeh the judgments of the courts and the facts and
the merits of the cases decided.

"Serre, V.73.
"Id.. p. 3.
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III.

Tim NOVEL THEORWES OF RESPONSIBILITY.

General dissatisfaction with the theory and results of the
law we have just discussed led to a search for some new theory
upon which to base a mord satisfactory law of employers' liability. In this chapter the principal theories proposed for that
purpose will be presented and discussed.
Theory of ContractualResponsibility.
Because between employer and employee there is a contractual relationship, the law governing responsibility for accidents that occur during that relationship should be differentiated
from the law governing responsibility for accidents between
18
strangers.
The theory of contractual .responsibility starts with the contract of employment. That contract, it is argued, creates rights
in favbr of and obligations upon the employer and employee
respectively. Being a contract of good faith it includes not only
what is expressly agreed to, but also everything that equity, custom or the law implies from its nature. Under all contracts,
besides the principal obligation, there arise incidental or secondary obligations, assuring its faithful execution. One of such
natural consequences of the labor contract is to bind the employer
to take all precautions indispensable to the security of the
workman.1 9

According to the measure of responsibility ascribed to the
20
employer, this general theory takes three specific forms:
i. The theory of absolute guarantee. "The employer is
bound to look out for the safety of the workman; that is, he is
bound to preserve the workman safe and sound during the course
of the dangerous work confided to him. The employer must
always be.-able to discharge the workman to himself as sound
as when received, just as the bailee of a thing must return it
21
intact to the bailor at the end of the bailment."
11

Sagot, p. 30.
"Bouyer. pp. 66-7.
Bouyer, p. 67.
Sauzet. cit. Douyer. pp. 69-7o.
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The fatal objection to this theory is that it takes no account
-of the workman's mastery over his own acts, which, to judge
from statistics, are the element responsible for at least twentyfive per cent. of all occupational accidents. Is it admissible to
presume a contract, between free men, which ignores such an
22
important circumstance.
2. The theory of the duty of vigilance. "The employer in
the organization of the work he directs is bound to take all necessary precautions, within the limits of possibility, against the
dangers inherent in the work. This surveillance should be more
active in a dangerous industry and over young and. inexperienced
persons. The measure of the vigilance required of the employer,
'23
therefore, varies according to circumstances.
The practical -purpose of tis theory is to justify a reversal
of the burden of proof. And it is contended by its advocates
that such-is its logical consequence. The employer, it is argued,
owing his employee a guarantee of all necessary precautions,
where the latter is injured in the course of the employment, the
employer is presumed not to have fulfilled his obligation, but is
presumptively at fault. Consequently in order to recover damages the workman need not prove his employer's fault, but the
burden of proof is 'on the latter to show that he has fulfilled his
obligation and that the acciderit is not imputabl6 to him. The
practical result of this consequence is that in doubtful cases or
where proof is impossible or difficult, the employer is liable.
whereas under the theory of responsibility solely ex delicto the
24
injured employees would suffer the loss.
This theory has been overwhelmed by criticisms, of which
it is sufficient to note the following: If by the labor contract
the employer may justly be held to have contracted to take all
possible precautions to guarantee the safety of his employee, then
the latter also must be held to have contracted to observe rules
and discipline and to exercise due care. Why then, in case of
"njury,presume the fault of the employer rather than that of the
*Ancey, p. 1.q.
Planiol. cit Bouyer. pp. 71-2.
"Morin P. 12.
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employee? 25 Or, even eliminating the idea that the workman
should be deemed to have contracted to observe rules and discipline, etc., yet the practical consequence claimed, the shifting
of the burden of proof, does not logically follow. "The accident
does not suffice to prove that all the precautions necessary
.

.

.

have not been taken by the employer, for in case of

doubt and a priori, there is no reason to attribute it to his fault
rather than to force mnajeure or the imprudence of the
26
workman.
3. The theory of responsibility for "vices." "By virtue of
the general principles governing the contract of hiring,
each of the contractants is responsibile for the vices that may bb
found in the things that he confides to or in the places wher hi
installs the other party, in the exectition of the- contract. He is
responsible for the damage caused by such vices, even though
he has had no knowledge of them at the time of the contract..
.

.

.

These principles, admittedly applicable to the hiring of

things, apply equally to the hiring of labor or industry, for they
of the 'Contract. No reason car/ bi
arise from the very nature
27
found for a distinction.1
The purpose of this theory is the same as that of the
preceding theory, i. e., to .jusiify a reversal of the burden of
proof. It is subject to the same objections.
The first form of this theory was enunciated by the French
jurist, Sauzet, in 1883 and by the Belgian Sainctellette in 1884.
Reduced to the second form it gained some favor in the Belgian
courts. And some sort of a theory of contractual responsibility
was the basis for the German law of 1871, the Swiss law of 1877,
and the bill introduced in the French Chamber of Deputies, May,
i88o, by Martin Nadaud.2B
Theory of Responsibility for Things Under One's Care.
So far all theories noticed have based the employer's responsibility upon the idea of fault-actual, presumed or, imputed
WSagot, p. 47.
Bouyer. p. 70.
Esmein, cit Bouyer. pp. 7.-6.
Ancey. v. 14: Bouyer. op. 68. 73.

JURISPRUDENCE OF I'ORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 833

But there is another juridical basis for such responsibility-the
obligation to bear a risk. This obligation may fall upon the
employer, either because he has under his care things that cause
damage, or because he is the master of an enterprise that creates
risks. Hence two theories of responsibility without fault-the
theory of responsibility for things under one's care, and the
29
theory of trade risk.
The former theory, "theorie du fait des-choses," is presented
in the following excerpts and paraphrases:
One is responsible not only for the damage caused by one's
faults, but also for that caused .by things which one has under
ones care.
"Where an injury is truly caused by our property, we are
always and necessarily bound to repair it, even though Mio one
can reproach us with any illicit act or culpable omission. For our
responsibility 'has its source, not in a contractual or delictual
fault, but in the law itself. The claimant of damages, then, need
prove only one fact; namely, the connection of cause and effect
between our property and the prejudice suffered. This is an
objecive theory substituted for a subjective theory."3 0
According to this objective theory, the responsibility resting
upon the owner (the employer being considered as the owner,
or, better, as the guardian), has nothing to do with contract or
tort; it springs directly from the law. "Its basis is not a presumption of fault, but a legal obligation to bear a risk. The
damage caused by an object should be borne by its owner, that
is, by him who profits from it, all idea of fault being put aside.
Responsibility ceases to have its basis in the fault of the owner,
that is, in subjective fault. Simply the injury caused by the
thing, or rather the act of the thing, called the objective fault,
suffices to create the responsibility."3 1
"The idea of fault has not truly been altogether eliminated; on the contrary it subsists, but transformed. It is no
Bouyer. pp. 6. ioo.
N

Josserand. cit. Bouyer. p. iO.

' Bouyer. p.

T17.
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longer personal fault, relating to the accident, that the law looks
for, but an exterior fault implied from the facts."' 2
"The persons responsible, under this objective theory are,
properly speaking, not the owners of the things that have caused
the damage, but their guardians, that is, 'those who have them
under their care-those who use them.'" As between an employer and an employee, it is the employer, "who, in the juridical
and social sense, has the care of the machine. Consequently the
risks from the thing are for the employer, considered as guardian
s
rather than as owner."o s
In general this theory applies .to all things, animate- and
inanimate, that are susceptible of appropriation and. are under
one's care. 34 In order to be entitled to indemnity the workman
has to establish a connection of causality, no longer between the
accident and a fault of his employer, but simply between the accident and a thing of his employer's. That connection is the sole
but a necessary condition to responsibility.3 5 But the responsibility does not arise unless the accident is fully caused by the thing.
Consequently the thing must be not only the material but also
the original cause-it must be the efficient and not only the
occasional cause. Consequently the objective criterion of responsibility prescribed by this theory is far from being so simple and
easily determinable as appears at first impression. 6 Injuries
due to force majeure, to acts or things of third parties, to the
injured persons' own faults, or to dangerous conditions of employment are not covered.37 The responsibility of the employer
for damage caused by his thing is for "ieparation," not "damages." It should be disassociated from all idea of punishment,
as if for wrong. 38 It is appropriate, therefore, that the indemnity
should be fixed and limited by the law.
I Bouyer. p. "4.
"Id., pp. 128-9.
T Id., p. r3o.

'Morin. pp. 16-17.
Morin. V. 21: Ronyer. Pv. 132.
'Morin,
). 2T: Bouyer. p. x3i.
'Bouyer, p. zz.

141.
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This theory was vaguely enunciated as early as. 187i. s* In

the late nineties it was obscured by the efforts of the jurists
Saleilles and Josserand to base it upon a novel interpretation of
Articles 1384 and 1386 of the French Civil Code. 9 But in the
course of discussions it has been advanced again and again in a
pure form, and, especially in limited application to extra dangerous things, it is widely accepted and has exerted considerable influence upon all liability laws.4°
Nevertheless this theory, although possibly sound as far as
it goes, will not suffice. Its criterion of responsibility is too abstract to be exact and practical, and too simple to be comprehensive. It necessitates a precarious search for the original or
efficient cause before responsibility can be determined. And it
omits from the scope of the employer's responsibility accidents
due to causes, such as dangerous conditions, for which he may
be just as much responsible as he is for his material things. 41
Theory of Trade Risk.
This theory, better known by its French title of risque professionel, is said to have been in the air throughout Europe at an
eaTlier date, but seems to have been presented for the first time in
an applied form in the bill introduced by Felix Faure in the
French Chamber of Deputies, February 1I, 1882.
To summarize its principles in a few words: 42 Every initiative entails risks. One is responsible when one acts and in proportion to-one's acts. 43 The initiative of the employer is primary.

His activity predominates in industry. Therefore he is responsible for a greater part of the trade risk. But the employee also
acts through a free choice of occupation and a voluntary acceptance of the conditions of his employment, arid to some extent
remains master of his own acts. He, therefore, is responsible
' Bouyer, pp. 113-114.
" Bouyer. pp. xi8. 134-140.

"Cf. SL L & S. F. R'y v. Mathews, 6s U. S. 1 (4.897) at p. 9; Hart v.
Vest. R. R. Co.. z3 Mletc. O9 (Mass. 1848) at pp. 103-4; and Rylands Y.
Fletcher. L R. i Exch. 282 (1866).
' Morin, pp. 23-4; Bouyer, pp. 141-2.
0
Ancey. v.x6.
' Cf. Holmes. "The Common Law.
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for a substantial part of the trade risk. There is, therefore,
ground for a division of the risk.
The division of the risk must be fixed by the contract of employment. But, lest the workman should be forced to contract
to assume all the risks, if left to make the contract for himself,
public policy requires that the law should fix the division and im4
pute a contract accordingly. "
This theory involves the abandonment of the search for responsibility,, in the traditional sense of that word. For it distinguishes the idea of responsibility from the idea of fault, and
45
establishes a line of responsibility for causation, without fault
This is a novel conception. The idea of risk is .substituted
for the idea of fault. Where a person exercises an activity, employing others to the extent of making them his passive instruments, he is responsible for the consequences of his initiative and
46"
particularly for the risks incurred by those who serve him.
According to this theory the idea of fault is a false point of
departure, that should be avoided. The majority of accidents, in
extra-hazardous occupations at least, are not imputable to the
faults either of employers or of the injured employees, but are
the results of the more or less dangerous nature either of the
work or of the means and conditions. Therefore it is altogether
wrong to search ingeniously for faults or to presume or impute
47
or invent them in order to establish responsibility.
"This theory of risque professionel is only a particular and
special application of the general principle, that: 'He ought to
bear the consequences who has directed the damage producing
force and occasioned the injury suffered by creating a risk for
his own interest.' 'Periculum ejus esse debet, cujus commodum
est.'

"48

The liability for damages ex delicto is in the nature of a penalty, whereas the liability under this theory is not to be considAncey. pp. 17.
"Ancey. P. 1.5.
"Sazot. D. &6

27.

Sagot, pp. z46-7.
Bouyer. PV. T48 -Q.
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ered in any degree as a penalty but simply as an equitable reparation for dimage done.49 The trade risk is the risk incidental to
a given trade, occupation or task, independent of the faults of the
employer or employee. " It is approximately identical -with those
usual and ordinary risks, which, under the English Common Law,
the servant was deemed to have .assumed, risks caused by faults
of co-employees and third parties included. Simply by reason of
his occupation, in the majority of industries, the workman is exposed to inevitable chances of accident, from which he cannot protect himself and which, the employer, whatever be his vigilance,
cannot prevent. 51 These constitute the trade risk in its very
strictest sense.
Given these risks ought their consequences be borne by him
who draws only wages or by him who enjoys the chance of profit,
or should they be divided? "To answer this delicate question we
have recourse to a principle of common sense and social equity.
The inevitable damages entailed by an enterprise should be borne
by and distributed among those who profit from the enterprise.
Participation in the profits calls for a proportionate contribution
to the losses: 'Ubi emoluntentum, ibi et onus.' This principle
shows upon whom should fall the charge of the trade risk-

52
namely, the industry."

The danger being inherent in the industry it is just that the
industry should bear the loss therefrom. "It is -the industry
rather-than the employer that is responsible. That is the fundamental idea of this new theory. The employer is held liable, not
as being ctlpable nor. even as being strictly responsible in the
older sense of that word, but as the appropriate economic disI of protributor of all the charges that enter into his expense
5
duction."
"The sum of the indemnities enters into the cost of the
enterprise by the same right as the expense of repairing machinBouyer. v.iz.
*Sagot. p. 49.
"Bouyer. v.i46.

"Bouyer. P. ixo.
S"Faure.

cit Sagot, p. So.

838

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

ery. It ought, therefore, to be taken into account in calculating
' '5
the price of the product. '
"But what is the industry? From the economic point of
view, the industry consists of the union of two factors---capital
and labor.

.

.

.

Associated in the work of production, the

employer and his workmen should each bear a part in the risk.""
A later variation of the theory is here to be noted: The
foregoing system, "at first sight so equitable, is not altogether
satisfying.

.

.

.

These two factors, the employer and his

employee are united rather than associated. One is subordinated
to the other. One obeys the direction and orders of the other.
Practically, then, the industry is personified in the employer, who
creates the plant, maintains it, exploits it as he wishes, and alone
draws profits from it. Therefore it is for .the employer to respond for the injurious consequences of the risks of the industry.""6 This idea has been frequently advanced as an argument
in support of the proposition that upon the employer alone should
fall the charge for the "compensation", that is of the partial
reparation to be paid to the injured workman; but it also
appears to have been often advanced, as in the foregoing excerpt,
as the basis for the measure of responsibility. For the latter purpose it suffers from not being in conformity with facts, both in
exaggerating the subordination of the workman and in ignoring
his share in the profits of industry through wages.
The liability in question, having its basis in the contract of
employment, covers only the economic loss from an injury to the
person caused by the trade risk; and the remuneration under that
" Cheysson. cit. Sagot. p. . o.

"Bouyer, p. i5o. The same idea, approached from a different angle, is
thus expressed by Professor Ernst Freund, discussing the constitutionality of
the compensation principle under our American constitutions: "Can the legislature say to the employer: 'If for the purpose of your business you provide

and require the use of dangerous appliances which are humanly speaking
certain to result in accidents, you shall not let the consequences of the accidents lie where they fall, but assume your share"of them?' The principle of
making a common peril of a common venture is not unknown to our jurisprudence; in another form and application it is not unlike the principle
which, under the name of general average, is familiar to the maritime law
of all nations. If the Common Law has not developed such a principle this
simply proves that the Common Law is not the last word of all wisdom and

justice." ("The Survey", April 29, 19:i.)

. ".Bouyer, p. isi; cf. Sachet, p. Ii.
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contract is the general basis for the measure of the loss.57 Accidents not caused by a risk of the particular occupation or which
are caused solely by force ,najeureor by a fault of the employer
or of the injured workman are not covered. This is the pure
theory. For practical reasons the laws based upon this theory are
all given a wider scope.
a more moral
Associated with the theory of trade risk .is
conception of "fault" than that which has grown up under the
law of liabilityex delicto. Under this conception all presumed,
imputed and other fictitious faults disappear, and mere occasional
acts of imprudence or inadvertence, such as are inevitable at
times to all human beings, are deemed to belong in a different
category from torts.581 How far this contraction of the idea of
fault should be pushed remains a subject of differences of opinion.
But even in its .most restricted extension this conception greatly
enlarges the sphere of the trade risk and contracts the proportion
of accidents to be ascribed to faults.
The theory of trade risk has been here presented in its purest
abstract form, in order to make clear its juridical nature. In a
later chapter it will be shown that the compensation laws selected
for consideration are distinctly based upon this theory.
Theory of Responsibility for Existence.
Contemporaneously with and opposed to all the theories hereinbefore discussed has existed a Socialist doctrine, which, of late
years, has been propounded also as a juridical theory of responsibility.
According to that theory: "The theory of trade risk, which
holds the employer responsible for the risks he has created, is a
theory imagined by jurists in order to bring within the domain
of jurisprudence a novel economic and social conception of the
obligations of employers towards employees." 59
The difficulties and uncertainties incident to the application of that theory, as developed in practical experience under
T

Bouyer, pp. 11-13.
"Bouyer, p. x62.
'Morin. p. 93.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

840

L4I- REVIEW

the compensation laws, demonstrate its inaptitude and that a
simpler theory is needed. 60
Moreover the idea at the basis of the whole movement of
public opinion which led up to the workmen's compensation law in
France and other countries was not the juridical and subtle idea
of trade risk. -It was "a far simpler social idea, in circulation
long before there was any notion of 'trade risk', niamely, the idea
that the workman ought to be guaranteed against the uncertainties of the future, that he ought to be protected against the risks
that threaten him, in a word that he has a 'right to existence', and
that his labor should insure him that right.""1
Wages should not be considered simply as compensation to
cover so many hours of -labor; for they are the sole resource of
the laborer. "Consequently they should suffice for his support
while idle as well as while at work, and should provide for him
during infancy and old age as well as during full-manhood, during sickness as well as during health, and during days of neces02
sary idleness as well as during days of labor."1
Consequently the employer owes his employee not only a living wage from day to day, but also assurance against any loss of
that wage through misfortune. "If is the workman's right to
existence that constitutes the basis of his employer's responsibility.
This responsibility has its source in the person of the workman
and not in that of the employer. Consequently the employer is
responsible for accidents as to which he is in every sense a
stranger. '8 3 He is responsible for every accident happening to his
employee, whensoever or wheresoever it may occur and whatsoever may be its cause. 6 4 Being responsible for his employee's
existence, the employer's liability is not limited by the wage loss,
should the "needs" of the workman and his family exceed that
sunm.
This radical theory is presented simply to distinguish it from
the political theory of State-socialism, which underlies the social
"Morin, pp. 83-go
'Jay, cit. Morin. pp. 93-4. and Bouyer, p. x4&

Sismondi, cit. Morin, p. 94.
"Morin, p. 9-.
"Morin. pp. w-&
a
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insurance systems of Germany and Austria. Briefly that latter
theory is that the state owes to its industrious working-people not
only the protection of its laws but also a reasonable guarantee
of the material necessities of life. Accordingly the state taxes
workmen, employers and the public generally to maintain insurance for the workmen against their most common misfortunes.
Under such social insurance systems, however, the accident insurance is put on a different basis from the other lines of insurance, being assimilated to the compensation law and based upon
the theory of trade risk, as will be hereinafter more fully explained.k."
IV.

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE COMPENSATION LAWS.

Having now reviewed the principal juridical theories of responsibility, it remains to be shown that the compensation laws
are based upon one of them, namely, upon the theory of trade
risk. For that purpose will be-presented in this chapter a brief
outline of the genesis of each of the four laws selected for consideration, and an analysis of its most important provisions, sufficient only to make clear its principles.
The French Law.
The problem that presented itself to the French legislators
in the early eighties of the last century was intensely practical.
Indeed the then existing law of employer's liability, based upon
the theory of responsibility solely ex delicto, was generally condemned, not so much because of its theory, for few outside of the
legal profession comprehended that theory, ,but because its practical results offended the popular sense of justice.

The results demanded by the public conscience, judging from
various records, may be roughly summarized in the following

items: A recognition of the right of the workmen to an indemnity
in the largest proportion of cases reasonably possible; a fixed
rate of indemnity, mutually equitable and at the same time sufficient for relief; the reduction of litigation, and for that purpose

elimination, generally, of the vague and trouble-breeding issue
InfIra, pp. 859,856.
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of "fault"; and some assurance of the payment of the indemnity,
not too burdensome to industry. 65
That, in response to such demands, a law of private rights
and obligations, should'be shaped, in some of its features, with a
view also to satisfying public utility, was too well supported by
precedents to occasion much comment. But it was objected that
the proposed law went further, and that what it would establish
was simply a system devised a posteriori to accomplish certain
social results. 6" But this objection was ultimately abandoned by
all except a few irreconcilables.
The question of amending the principles of the law of employer's liability first receiVed the attention of the French National Assembly in i88o when, on May 29, M. Nadaud introduced
a bill providing for the reversal of the burden of proof. Other
bills on the general subject were introduced from i88i to x883,
among them being a bill by Felix Faure, based upon the theory
of trade risk, which provided for the payment of indemnities
through an insurance institution, and a bill by Count de Mun,
based upon the same theory, but providing for the insurance of
indemnities in mutual associations- to which employees should
contribute.6 7 These measures were the subjects of many discussions and reports. They all culminated in a bill drawn by a
parliamentary commission, which was adopted by the Chamber of
Deputies October 4, 1884, but which failed to pass the Senate.
The Government then instituted an extra-parliamentary commission, which formulated a proposition that served as a basis for
bills introduced December 29, 1885, and February-2, x886. Other
bills emanating from members of the National Assembly were
introduced in I885, i886, 1887, 1888, i89o,. I89i, x893 and
1895, notable among which was the bill-of June 26, x886, by
Felix Faure, definitely, to establishtrade risk as thejuridical basis
of a direct legal liability, All, of these bills were more or less
lpngthily discussed;but all failed..
C1. Bellom. cit. Bouyer. p. z46.
"Vil eroux, cit. Bouyer, note pp. 173-4.
Serre, pp. 251-2.
Sagot, pp. 78-z78; Report, Commissioner of. Labor, pp. 68t-3.
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By this time the theory of trade risk seems to have won the
field. But the parliamentary struggle still continued with una-.
bated vigor over various subsidiary questions. And it was only
after nearly twenty years of agitatioh, struggles and debates,
that the final bill was introduced in the Senate February 14, 1898,
and adopted March 19, 1898. The Chamber of Deputies then
adopted it, March 26, 1898. It became a law April 9, 1898, going
into operation July I, 1899.
Reviewing the debates and the measure finally adopted:
By general agreement wilful wrongs were excluded from the
application of the proposed law; but slight faults gave rise to some
controversy, and serious faults remained long a subject of disagreement.
On the one hand, it was insisted that slight faults.belong in
different category from wrongs, and that it would
entirely
an
be better to assimilate- them to the trade risk and to treat alike all
accidents resulting from either of these causes.
On the other hand, there were those who "wished to establish 'categories of accidents, contending that those due to pure
fortuity or force majeure alone ought to be classed under the
trade risk, that in other cses the employer and workman respectively should each be held responsible for his personal faults, that
such is the spirit of the civil law, and that it is necessary to maintain this distinction, under penalty of enfeebling the just and salutary principle of responsibility."' 9
In response it was argued that in practical application this
attractive theory for maintaining the sense of personal responsibility would be a source of perpetual disputes, since every victim
would have an interest to show that the accident was due to the
fault of the employer, and vice versa; and, consequently, that it
would give rise to incessant litigation, involving a return to all
the uncertainty, contradictions, delays and general failure of jus70
tice that characterized the old law.
Supporting this latter view it was argued:"
p.
Serre, V.
"Id.. pp. 9-io.
n Tolain. cir. Sagot, P.9&.
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"What in fact is the exact responsibility of an employer, if,
when urged on by demands for delivery on a day fixed, under
penalty for delay, he presses his employees to work overtime,
when fatigue makes the sight less clear and the hand less sure?
*'X\hat is the exact responsibility of the workman who in
the rush of work, obliged to follow the automatic movement of
machinery, inadvertently neglects this or that minor rule or
precaution?
"What is that of the employer, who, in the rush season,
believes it possible to delay for several days or even hours, some
required repairs or changes, not apparently of pressing necessity, in order not to interrupt his work?
"Is it not more simple, prudent and just, in the dangerous
industries, to group all accidents due to such causes under the
trade risk?"
That view prevailed.
BttThe question of serious faults still remained to be settled.
M. Faure cotiended that they also should be covered, apparently
as incidental to the principal liability. Others contended that to
do so would be immoral and prejudicial to safety in industry.
In reply the fact that the indemnity would be only partial was
emphasized; and it was argued that before serious faults could
be excluded they would have to be clearly differentiated from
slight faults, which is impossible, because faults vary in degree as
imperceptibly as the change from daylight to dark, with no point
at which a reasonable and practicable line of demarcation can
be drawn. Moreover, under. the complex conditions of modern
industry the cause of an accident is very often impossible to determine. Hence, two serious elemeits of uncertainty-that of
cause and that of fault.
Under these circumstances, the employer having always an
interest to ascribe the accident to a serious fault of the workman
and the workman to ascribe it to a serious fault of the employer,
the practical advantages to the parties of a fixed indemnity would
be sacrificed. 72 The final compromise on this question was to
increase the indemnity for "inexcusable negligence" on the part
of the employer and to reduce it for such negligence on the part
" Serre, p. x7.
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of the injured employee, and to include all lesser degrees of fault
under the trade risk.7s
The determination of the occupations to which the new law
74 Appreciation of
should apply also presented grave difficulties.
the necessity for a change in the law of employers' liability having grown out of the transformation of industries incidental to
the introduction of power machinery, the disposition of the lawmakers was to limit the application of the new law to those industries in which such machinery is used, including therein employments in connection with the manufacture or handling of explosives. 75 Those who relied upon the theory of responsibility
for the care of dangerous things ' -sought to limit the application of the proposed law to truly extra-hazardous or "dangerous"
industries or occupations.
But each and both of these grounds- fr a restricted application were severely attacked. The most ardent advocates of the
theory of trade risk and its most bitteri critics united in demanding for it the widest application.76 The former contended that
there is a trade risk in all industries and even outside of industries. If a clerk in a professional office -is injured by an explosion
in an adjoining factory, why, it was argued, should he be denied
compensation any more than a workman employed in that factory? 7 The latter insisted that if the principle be adopted at all
it should be followed to its logical conclusion. Why recognize
the existence of trade risk and then refuse to recognize its con7
sequences except in some arbitrarily selected occupations? "
To the proposed application to dangerous industries only,
it was objected that no certain line of demarcation could be
drawn between such industries or employments and those wherein
there is nothing to fear from accidents. The legislators could
U Serre, pp. 238-242.

"Sagot, p. 91 et seq.
"Sagot. P. oz.
-

"a See supra. pp. 8.33-35"Bouyer. note p. 175.
Sagot, pp. 92, io6, 143.
Bouyer, pp. 174-5.
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not draw a reasonable line themselves nor could they properly
avoid the difficulty by leaving it to administrative officials to
79
solve.
To an attempt to simplify the problem of defining dangerous
industries by identifying them with those industries that use
modern machinery, etc., it was objected that the adoption of
modern methods in industry has had the effect not of increasing
the risks bht of diminishing them. It is the more ancientforms
of industry, with carting at the head, that are the most dangerous, whereas the textile industry, with its masses of power machinery, is at the other end of the scale. Of all motors the horse
is the most dangerous8 0 .
In strict logic these arguments were almost convincing. But
the legislators preferred to consider the matter from the practical
standpoint. From that standpoint the experimental nature of the
new legislation had to be considered. It was advisable to be
prudent, to test the new remedy first in a limited application, and
later perhaps to extend it, according to results.8
The practical conditions were that from "grand industry"
particularly, from the employers as well as from the employees'
therein, came the demand for relief from the insufficiency, uncertainties, expensive litigation and class warfare ol the old
law. 2 It was in "grand industry" that the consequences of the
risks were most distressing and that the proportion of wage
earners was the highest. And there, also, insurance, generally a
necessary incident for the protection of the employer under the
new liability, had already become usual, whereas in other employ83
ments it was almost unknown.
Moreover it was felt that there was really some distinction
in principle. The need for the new remedy resulted from the
changed -conditions in the more modern forms of industry. 84 In
the first place, the relations between the employer and employee
"Serre, p. is; Sagot,'p. zos.
Serre, p. is; Sagot, p. 163; contra, Bouyer, p. 30.
Sagot, p. 93; Bouyer, pp. i75-6.
Serre, p. M
"Bouyer, p. z76.
"Bouyer, p. z77.
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are different-less personal and more remote. In the second
place, there is a difference in the character of accidents. Under
the simpler conditions of the more ancient forms of labor the
causes of each accident can more often be determined and responsibility for faults correctly appraised, whereas under the
more complex conditions of the more modern forms of industry
that is generally impracticable.8 5 In the third place, under the
older forms of industry the'employee is the master of his own
actions and manages his own tools, whereas under the more
modern forms he is himself more of a tool in his master's machine,
and is thereby subjected to a novel risk.88 From very early times
there have been special laws for seamen and miners, based upon
the doctrine that they are in a class by themselves, because unusually dependent for safety upon the skill and care of the one directing the work and upon the skill and care of their fellows.8 7 Similar reasons seemed to justify putting "grand industry" in a class
by itself. Finally, there was the influence and authority of precedents-the fact -that all the compensation laws then enacted were
restricted in application to the so-called "dangerous", really the
"grand" or modem forms of industries. 88
The conclusion reached was to limit the application of the
law to certain enumerated industries, the so-called dangerous
industries, namely manufacturing, mining, quarrying, building
and transporiation- by land or water. By subsequent amendments its scope has been extended to include employment in mercantile establishments, and in agricultural or other work where
mechanical power is used.
Not all employments in the industries covered by the law are
subject to it, but only those wherein the employer engages the
'Bouyer, pp. 26-3o.
Serre, pp. 8. x4.
'Report, Commissioner of Labor, pp. 4-5.
' Germany, Act of 1884; Austria, Act of 1887; Norway, Act of x895; Finland. Act of 1895; and Great Britain. Act of 1897. These precedents were followed later by Denmark, Act of 1898; Italy, Act of 1898; Spain, Act of
18gs; Sweden, Act of 91o; Belgium, Act of x9o3; Switzerland, Act of 1gli;
and Russia. Act of 1913. The only European exceptions are, Germany, which
has applied the law to agriculture; France, to mercantile occupations, and
Great Britain. to all !mployments of service.
I
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services of the employee for a specified task, reserving to himself
the right of direction.8 9 To use an expression of English law,
the employment must be under a "contract of service".
The subject for reparation under the law is the economic
loss resulting from an injury to the person of the workman,
caused by a risk of the employment. The basis for computing
such loss is the earnings of the workman, as contemplated by the
parties to .the contract of employment; generally, therefore, the
wages or remuneration under the contract. . But where concurrent contracts of employment are within the contemplation of the
parties, the total wages under both contracts are the basis.
Strictly all injuries to the person resulting from a risk of
the employment should be covered, -whether by accident or not.
Consequently in strict logic the law should apply to "professional diseases." But, for. the practical reason that it is most
difficult to determine the origin of such diseases, and because the
methods of determination had not then been studied, it was
decided temporarily to exclude them from the application of the
law. 90 Since its enactment a measure providing for compensation for professional diseases has been in preparation.
In the debates previous to its enaictment it was agreed that
the law should provide reparation only for the consequences of
the injury resulting directly from the accident, exclusive of
aggravations resulting from sickness or other causes anterior
or posterior to the accident."' Subsequently, however, the courts
have given the law a much different construction and effect.92
As to the accidents to be covered, there was considerable
difficulty in agreeing upon the exact formula to define them.
That finally selected limited the application of the law to those
that occur "par le fait ou a l'occasion du travail." Freely translated that means that the occupation of the injured workman
must be either the direct or the occasional cause of the accident.
-Bouyer,

p. 14.

Sagot, p. 113.
pp. 1q3-4.
92 Sagot,
Cf. Sachet.
p. 242
'

ef Seq.
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There must, therefore, be a causal connection between the accident
93
and a risk incidental to the work.
In the course of the debates the idea was suggested that the
rate of indemnity to be fixed by the law should at first be low
and that subsequently it should be gradually raised as high as
industry could stand. 94 But this suggestion was unfavorably
received. What was sought for was a mutually fair rate for a
division of the economic loss resulting from each accident. The
quest for such a rate gave rise to two different views.
According to one idea the loss from the trade risk should be
divided almost equally between the employer and the injured
employee. 4 a But in concrete form the problem was rendered
more complex by the fact that the law was to cover not only
accidents resulting from the trade risk, but also those resulting
from certain categories of faults. Consequently. in arriving at a
fair average division some allowance had to be made for the
relative degrees in which such faults of employers and employees
respectively contribute to the aggregate loss.
There were cited various estimates of the proportions in
which industrial accidents in the mass are due to employers' and
employees' faults and to the trade risk respectively. Therein the
trade risk was variously estimated to be the cause of from forty
to seventy per ceint. of the accidents, employers' faults of from
ten to twenty per cent., and workmen's faults of from twenty to
forty per cent. Obviously these estimates varied both according
to the different conceptions of fault in the minds of those who
made them and according to the industries covered.
Was it then possible to fix a fair rate of division a priori?
Yes, it was answered early in the debates (1888), not, however,
by attempting to measure scientifically and exactly the respective
shares of the parties in causation, for that is impossible, but by
making an equitable division based upon a notion of partnership
in responsibility. An enterprise is an association between the
employer and his employees, which equitably entails a partnership in the risks. If then a workman loses his wages by an
Serre, pp. 22-36.
'Cf. Sagot. p. 1o3.
'&Cf. spra, pp. 83S-836, 837-A
'3 Cf.
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occupational accident, the employer ought to share the loss-that
is, he ought to pay the injured workman half of the loss, and the
workman himself ought to suffer the other half.9"
From the standpoint of public policy everything was in
favor of this idea. But some years later (1896) another idea
was advanced. The employer ought to bear all the loss resulting
from the trade risk9 58 plus all the loss from his own faults, thus
making sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. of the loss an approximately fair average rate at which to fix his liability. 96
Between these two ideas the legislators vacillated, finally
compromising and fixing the rate of indemnity as follows: For
temporary incapacity a daily payment of fifty per cent. of the
daily wages. For permanent partial incapacity a pension of fifty
per cent. of the annual loss of earnings. And for permanent total
incapacity a pension of sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. of
average annual earnings. In addition the employer to pay the
cost of medical care. Noting that cases of permanent total incapacity are exceptional, it is manifest that the legislators
intended to make the employer liable on the average for a little
over one-half the loss. Whether the formula adopted successfully carries out that intention in prictice is a question that will
become relevant when we come to consider the abuses that have
arisen under the compensation laws.
It should be noted that although the central feature of this
law is the imputation of a contract to-compensate for accidents
not due to fault or wrong. nevertheless, to some extent the law
sounds in tort, because it covers also and, in fixing the rate of
indemnity, makes allowance for accidents attributable to faults.
It is, therefore, not exact to say that the idea of responsibility
for fault is entirely eliminated. It is true only that fault is no
longer the criterion of liability.
The debates on the question of insurance followed lines with
which we in America have recently become familiar. The pracSagot, pp. 103-4.

'- Cf. supra, p. 838.
SSagot P. 124.
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tical method of caring for industrial accident cases that, before
the advent of the compensation law, best satisfied the.popularconscience and the parties affected, was by the insurance of a
moderate indemnity in every case, either in the form of collective
insurance at the employer's sole expense, or of co-operative
insurance in establishment funds. The then existing law interfered seriously with the operations and growth of such practices.
Consequently there was an initial disposition on the part of the
lawmakers to regard *somesuch definite form of insurance as an
essential feature to the desired reform and to establish it by the
law. But that gave way gradually to the simpler juridical idea
of remodelling the law to harmonize with the ideas of justice
upon which those practices were based, leaving employers free
to adapt their insurance methods to their own particular needs.
First monopolistic state-managed insurance was rejected.
Then, compulsory insurance in employers' mutual associations.
And, finally, compulsory insurance altogether. All parties interested demanded a direct liability. But the idea prevailed early
that the workmen ought to have some guaranty of payment.
The question, then, was how reasonably to assure the payment to
the workmen, without unduly restricting the free initiative of
employers or burdening industry. From the workmen's standpoint all that is to be feared is the employer's insolvency. To
protect the workmen against that contingency it is sufficient to
require insurance solely against the employer's insolvency, and
not at all necessary to compel-the employer to carry full insurance. Accordingly the final conclusion was to secure payments
for temporary disabilities by a lien, and for permanent disabilities and fatal cases by a guarantee fund, to be maintained by a
small tax upon all the employers subject to the law. And, to
protect the employers against the possibility of a monopoly, a
state-managed insurance fund was established to compete with
private insurers."7
There was some criticism of the guaranty, on the ground
that it violated the principle of equality before the law and con"Maltet, pp. 37-105; Sagot, p. iz6.
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stituted of the workmen a privileged class.98 It was excused on
the grounds that its cost would be trifling and that the benefit

to the workmen would be great. And, moreover, the principle
of conferring small privileges upon the wage-earning class was
already established in the law.
The British Law.
The first change in Great Britain in the branch of law under
discussion, was the Employers' Liability Act of I88o, which
entitled workmen to recover, in a limited amount, for injuries
resulting from the negligent performance by superintendents,
etc., of the master's delegated duties and powers. It being found
that employers were frequently "contracting out" of their liability, by agreement substituting therefor insurance in private cooperative schemes, bills were introduced in Parliament in 1881,
1882 and 1883 to prohibit it.9 But the majority judgment being
favorable to such schemes, the bills failed to pass.
In 1893 the Liberal Government introduced a bill to abolish
the defence of common employment and to reduce the defence of
assumption of risks. This bill elicited the criticism by Mr.
Chamberlain that, "No amendment of the.law relating to employers' liability will be final or satisfactory which does not
provide compensation to workmen for all injuries in the ordinary
course of their employment, and not caused by their own acts
or defaults." A second bill was thereupon introduced by private
members, to make employers liable for compensation for all
injuries due to the employment, such compensation to be in the
form of annuities, of amounts specified, to be purchased of the
Post Office.10 0 Both bills failed.
Other bills were introduced the following years, without
success. Finally, on May 3, x897, the Conservative Government
brought in a bill, which, on August 6, became the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1897. In support of this bill it was argued
that workmen ought to be in a better position towards their
0 Maltet. pp. 79-ft
"Packer. p. iT.
10 Packer, p. zg.
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employers than strangers, and ought to be given a certain but
limited compensation for all accidents. Its sponsors admitted
that the principle of the bill was new, but based it upon the theory
that, "When a person on his own responsibility and for his own
profit sets in motion agencies which create risks for .others, he
ought to be civilly responsible for the consequences"' 0 1-a theory
reaffirmed in the debates preceding the later Act of i9o6. 10 2 The
wear and tear on the workmen, incidental to an industry, they
argued, should be a charge on that industry, just as is the wear
and tear on machinery. 10 3 A practical purpose of the bill, they
declared, was to establish a simple and inexpensive method of
settling doubtful questions.104
To the objection that the bill would put a legal where no
moral responsibility existed, Mr. Balfour replied that the law.
already did that by making a railroad responsible for an injury
to a passenger, even where caused by the mistake of a good
engineer. 10s
To the objection that the bill was a plunge into socialism,
Lord Salisbury replied that the existing law was socialistic and
not the bill, since the former, through the Poor Law, placed a
large portion of the loss on society, whereas the bill placed it
upon the industry that caused it.1 0 6
The indemnity was fixed at what was supposed to amount to
one-half of the wage-loss on the ground that that was a "fair"
1 07
measure.
There was some difficulty in reaching an agreement as to
what to do in regard to accidents resulting from faults. 108
Finally those due to the "serious and wilful misconduct" of the
injured workman were excluded altogether from the right to
indemnity; and, on the other hand, the employer's liability at
'"Packer, p. 21.
" Schwedtman & Emery, p. 9.
Packer, p. 22.
'"Id., p. 2z.
l"I d., p.
,Id., p. 22.
"Id., p. 23.
"Id., p. :z.
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Common Law and under the Employers' Liability Act of i88o
was left unimpaired.
Under this law compensation is payable only for accidents
"arising out of and in the course of the employment"; in other
words, the accident must occur at a time when the relation of
master and servant is really subsisting between the injured workman and his employer, and there must be a causal connection
between the accident and a risk reasonably incidental to the work
which it was the duty of that workman to perforin-gi7ing the
word "duty," however, a wide and liberal interpretation. 10 9
The principle of this law is that "the pecuniary results from
loss of life and injury incident to the carrying on of industrial
enterprise" should be regarded as "a part of the expense of production"; the employer, who initiates it, should pay this expense
in first instance, but "ultimately it will be paid by the

community." 110
The Act of 1897 applied only to the usual so-called dangerous industries. The principle of compensation has since been
extended by the Act of i9oo to apply also to agriculture, and
further extended by the Act of i906 to apply to approximately
all employments under "contract of service," but without change
in the principles of the law, except an ill considered amendmentl 1oa to allow compensation for serious injuries even though
resulting from "serious and wilful misconduct." The earlier acts
applied only to "injuries by accident"; but the Act of i906 covers
also specified professional diseases. NO other compensation law
has so broad a scope. In favor of this broad extension, "it was
argued that all ordinary misadventures happening to workmen
in the ordinary course of carrying on the work of the country
should be regarded as incidental to the expense of carrying on
such work, and ought to be a charge upon the particular industry.
and that this should be so quite irrespective of whether or not
the misadventure wag caused by fault."1 1
p. 339; cf. Elliott, pp. 18-92.
Ruegg, cit. Packer. p. 23.

" Ruegg,
11
m

'aRuegg, p. 455.
m Id., pp. 264-5.
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The German Law.
The German workmen's compensation law is in the formof insurance, and this accident insurance is co-ordinated with
other lines of insurance in a broad system of social insurance.
Nothing like that system ever existed before. But the form
given to the accident compensation law is rather a development
of old established practices than an innovation. Throughout
Germany numerous artisans' corporations and miners' brotherhoods, providing various types of mutual insurance to their members, have survived from earlier times, and in many instances
have been favored and helped by the employers.. In Bavaria,
under the Law of 1869, in Baden, under the Law of 187o, and in
Wurtemberg, under.the Law of 1873, workmen were insured
short sickness and disablement benefits by their communes, in return for small assessments upon their wages. In agriculture and
in domestic and mercantile service the old feudal relations or their
spirit, under which servants enjoyed some measure of protection
from their masters, also urvived. And the master's recognized
duties were early confirmed by law. The National Code of Prussia of i8io required the employer generally to provide maintenance and medical care during the disability of a domestic servant,
and, if the disability arose out of the service, also to pay wages.
And in commercial establishments employers were* required to
provide maintenance, care and wages for disabled employees for
various periods, usually for six weeks. 112
Consequently in numerous relations of employment the law
of liability ex delicto merely supplemented these simpler rights
and remedies, and was seldom used. But with the development
of modern industries and the creation of a new class of laborers,
among whom insurance was less general than among the older
type of artisans, it became for many the sole recourse.
The Prussian Law of 1838 amended the law last mentioned
as to accidents in the operation of railways, by reversing the burden of proof. The Imperial Law of 1871, extended the rule of
this earlier Prussian law throughout Germany, and in addition
.Report, Commissioner of Labor, pp. 980-2; cf. also Dawson, Chap. I.
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made the employer liable for accidents occurring in the operation
of a mine, quarry, pit, or factory, due to the negligence of a
"'vice-principal."' 1 3
After several years' experience under the Law of 1871 it was
generally recognized that conditions were not much improved.
With the wide prevalence and satisfactory results of co-operative
insurance, an extension and development of such insurance was
naturally looked to as the most obvious means of relief.
Following the public discussion of plans proposed by private
individuals and a comprehensive departmental investigation and
report, the Imperial Government, after discussion by a special
council of the Prussian Government, on March 8, i88x, brought
forward its first bill for social insurance. Its main features were
that employers operating mines, factories, etc., were required to
insure their workmen against economic loss from occupational
accidents, the insurance to be carried by a government insurance
institution, and the costs to be paid by the employer and the
workmen, supplemented by a substantial subsidy from the state."'
This bill is supposed to have been dictated by Bismarck, and was
defended by him as a measure purely of social relief. It was
attacked from all directions, and uponi various grounds. .Among
other criticisms it was objected that it was designed to bring
about a condition whereunder a vast number of small pensioners
would be dependent upon the government.'1 5 Being amended to
eliminate the federal subsidy and to substitute a system of state
insurance offices in place of the federal office, the bill was dropped.
After another departmental inquiry, which produced instructive statistics of industrial accidents, and the Emperor's famous
social insurance message of November 17, 1881, a revised bill

for a system of compulsory accident insurance was brought in on
May 8, 1882, along with a similar bill for compulsory insurance
against sickness. The sickness insurance was to be paid for by
the workmen, with liberal contributions from the employers,
and was to cover disability from accidents for the first thirteen
' Report, Commissioner of Labor, pp. 983-4.
1

°'Report, Commissioner of Labor, pp. 988-.
" Lichtenberger, p. 192.
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weeks. The accident insurance was to cover disability from occupational accidents only after the first thirteen weeks, was to be
paid for by the employers alone, except for a subsidy from the
government, and was to be administered by mutual insurance associations organized along trade lines.116
The sickness insurance bill was taken up first, passed June
15, 1883. and came into operation December I, 1884.117" The
accident insurance bill had a different fate. There were serious
objections to many details, and all parties opposed the government
subsidy."1 8 Accordingly a new bill was brought in by the
Government on March 6, 1884, which omitted the provision for
a government subsidy, thereby placing the entire charge upon
the employers. It was passed on July 6, 1884, and took effect
October 1, 1885.19 This law applied only to workmen employed
in mining, manufacture, etc. By subsequent laws its scope has
been greatly extended and various of its features amended, but
without material change in its principles.
The scale of the indemnity insured to the injured workmen,
after the thirteenth week, is generally sixty-six and two-thirds
per cent. of the loss of average earnings. Allowing for the part
of such loss from accidents shifted onto the sickness insurance,
the share thereof imposed upon employers is something less than
fifty per cent. Wilful injuries are not covered by the law. Compensation is payable only where the accident occurs in the course
of the employment and where there is a causal connection between
the injury and a risk incidental to the particular occupation of
1 20
the injured workman.
The principles of this law are thus stated by a high German
authority:
"i. Proceeding from the assumption that he who creates
an 'enterprise,' that peculiar structure of human beings, things
and forces, and induces human beings to labor among arms of
steel moving at uncanny speeds, establishes a source of danger
Report, Commissioner of Labor. p. 94
2" Id.,

p. 98%

ld., p. Qo
11d., pp. 990-I.
'Bulletin des Assurances Sociales, April,

19x4,

p. 2&
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and becomes responsible for damage resulting from this
source. Under this theory, employers' fault need not be proven.
The fact that the injury has been caused establishes a right to
compensation.
"2. Convinced that in many cases the resources of the
individual employer would not prove equal to the enormously
increased liability, and that therefore the existence of the
employer as well as the compensation of the injured worker
would be jeopardized, idividual responsibility was eliminated,
and in its stead was placed the collective responsibility of the
industry.
"3. To carry out this idea large industries as well as agriculture, commerce and crafts, or small industries, were organized into employer's associations grouped according to callings.
That is, legally incorporated self-governed bodies were formed,
which every employer was compelled by law to join. .
Upon these organizations was placed the responsibility of
carrying and administering the accident compensation system;

.

",2

Another authority declares the principles of the law to be as
follows:
"The Imperial legislation starts from this idea-that the
undertaker of an enterprise, who employs workmen in order to
appropriate to himself the economic value of the fruits of their
labor, owes them not only the agreed wages for this labor, but
ought also to bear with them the risks of accident resulting
from this labor. This conception has not taken the shape of
a principle of private law which governs the relations resulting,
in a juridical sense, from the labor contract; it has become one
of the tasks laid upon the state to take care of the victim of an
industrial accident or of those he leaves behind him; and this
task is accomplished with the means and according to the forms
dictated by public law. The right of the workman to the solicitude of the state is therefore wholly independent of an agreement relating to his work and the clauses it contains; he enjoys
this right even when there is no agreement of this sort and this
convention can neither modify this right or deprive him of it.
So, this right is not founded on a fault committed by the master
or one of his employees, and even a fault of the workman does
not affect it at all unless he has intentionally caused the accident.
The obligation to aid the workman is not a legal obligation
of the master toward his workmen, for master and
workman are not set against one another like debtor and
creditor, and they are powerless to vary the right of one to aids
- Neisser, cit. Schwedtman & Emery, pp. 27-8.
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and the obligation of the other to give them. The workmen or
their survivors receive the aids which come to them by an intermediary that the Empire or the Siate has delegated to perform
this duty, an intermediary who has with them no private legal
relation, who simply performs a public administrative function,
confided to him by imperial order, when he determines the
indemnity to be given to the workmen or effects its paymenLt" 12
The foregoing excerpts make it clear that the German accident insurance law is "public" and not "private" law, that it creates no relation of debtor and creditor between the employer and
his injured employee, and that it is a fulfillment of "one of the
tasks laid upon the state," by the political policy of state socialism. But when we go further and enquire why the state places
the whole charge of this insurance upon the employer, measuring
his premiums according to his risks, and limiting the application of the insurance to those accidents only resulting from risks
incidental to his enterprise, the first excerpt answers distinctly
that it is because the employer is deemed responsible for the trade
risk, whereas the second simply says that it is because the employer "ought to" bear the risks of occupational accidents with
his workmen. This difference in exposition reveals what appear
to be two different schools of thought in Germany, the one emphasizing the juridical nature of the workman's right to compensation and of the employer's obligation to provide for it, and the
other emphasizing the political policy of the insurance laws.1 2 8
But it seems evident simply from the terms of the workmen's
accident insurance law and from the historical events preceding
its enactment, that in it the principle of trade risk has penetrated
into a system of social insurance designed originally to rest solely
upon the policy of state-socialism and has been made the basis
of the employer's obligation to bear the entire charge for the
insurance. This is the general opinion of foreign commen124
tators.
In support of this conclusion it should be noted that although
under this law "the employer's individual responsibility was dim' Laband, "Droit Public de l'Empire Allemand", cit. Randolph, p. G.
= Cf. Kaskel, Bulletin des Assurances
Sociales, April 191, p. 2S.
' Schwedtman & Emery, p. 6; Sagot, p. 248; Sachet, p. 28.
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inated" and replaced by the collective responsibility of his trade
association, yet in turn he has been made liable to that association
for premiums in proportion to his risks, and consequently his individual obligation remains equivalent to what it would be if his
liability were direct to his employees, as under the compensation
laws of France and Great Britain.
The Austrian Law.
The evolution of the compensation law in Austria started
from social and industrial conditions very similar to those in
Germany, and thereafter followed very similar lines. Fraternal
organizations, providing mutual insurance against accidents and
sickness, were common among artisans and journeymen, surviving from the days of the medieval guilds. Among miner's particularly the insurance and the insurance organizations were best
developed. By the Mining Code of 1854, insurance was made
general among miners by compulsion and employers' contributions were exacted. By laws enacted in 1859 and 1867, attempts
were made to foster the spread of voluntary mutual insurance
in other industries, but without much success. Some progress
was made through proprietors of large industrial organizations
starting up private establishment funds for their workmen; but
the practice grew slowly. Consequently public opinion tended
towards compulsory insurance; and this tendency was accelerated
by the strong influence of events in Germany.-"'
In the early days of the factory system the Law of 1837
had placed on industrial proprietors an obligation to care for
their injured and sick laborers for four weeks. In 1883 the
Government introduced a bill to impose upon such employers a
presumption of responsibility for accidents in their industries and
to compel them to insure. This bill, however, failed. Finally,
in x886, the Government introduced a new bill, which became the
Law of December 20, 1887.126
This law applied only to industrial, agricultural and forestry
enterprises (mining being covered by its own special code) using
'Report, Commissioner of Labor, pp. 413, 33-36
Report, Commissioner of Labor, p. 35; Sagot, p. az.

JURISPRUDENCE OF WJORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 86!

mechanical motors, and only to those workmen exposed to the
risks of the machinery. By later amendments its scope has been
extended to include also transportation and certain miscellaneous
occupations.
Under this law, insurance, in peculiarly organized territorial
institutions, is compulsory. The employers bear the bulk of the
charge for the insurance, but may deduct one-tenth thereof from
the wages of such of their insured workmen as are paid over a
specified low rate. The indemnity provided is sixty per cent. of
the loss of average earnings, beginning at the end of the fourth
week of disability, the workman in the meantime being cared for
by sickness insurance. Allowing for the four weeks' waiting
period and the ten per cent. contribution by the wage earners to
the cost of the accident ingurance, the charge placed upon the employer is less than fifty per cent. of the loss. Wilful injuries are
not covered. 127 Otherwise compensation is payable for every
accident, occurring during the course of the employment, between
which and a risk of the employment there is a causal connection.1 28 "It may, therefore, be said that the law adopts fully the
12
doctrine of trade risk." '
V.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES.

So far attention has been concentrated upon the juridical
bases of the compensation law. It remains to consider briefly
how far it may also be based upon economic or sociological
theories.

Economic Theories.
The New York Court of Appeals in I911, referring to the
compensation law, stated:
"It is based upon the proposition that the inherent risks of
an employment should in justice be placed upon the shoulders
of the employer, who can protect himself against loss by insur-

ance and by such an addition to the price of his wares as to cast
the burden ultimately upon the consumer."30

Sagot, p. 252.
Sachet. p. 177.
Report. Commissioner of Labor, p. 38.
' Ives v. South Buffalo R'y Co., 2oi X. Y. 27. 294 (91). (Italics mine.)

UNV'ERSITY OF PEVNSYLVA4.4 L.4

862

REVIEV

An American commentator says:
"A prominent argument for the compensation laws is that
industry ought to bear a part of the loss inflicted upon workmen by accident instead of letting this press wholly upon them,
and, in making the employer the paymaster, it is assumed that
the expense will be passed on to the consumers as an item in the
cost of production."18 12
The foregoing excerpts are quoted to present a proposition
in economics which has often carelessly or ignorantly been advanced in support of the compensation law, but which does not
underlie that law. When the measures for the compensation laws
we are reviewing were under debate many of their advocates
contended that the greater part of the indemnities would be paid
by consumers; 132 but even that qualified contention was vigorously contradicted and denied both in the French 133 and in the
British 134 Parliament. And economists taught then, as they
teach now, that the incidence of the charge will vary under different conditions, but that ultimately the greater part of it will
probably come out of wages. 3 ' And, although in the parliamentary debates undue emphasis, for political reasons, was given to
the possibility of the charge coming wholly out of prices instead
of partially or wholly out of wages or profits, there appears to
be no valid ground for the belief that the proponents of the compensation laws based them upon an economic assumption then
generally recognized to be at least partially false.
What, then, is the economic doctrine of the compensation
law? To make it clear the principles of trade risk will be restated in their economic aspects: As between the injured workmen, on the one hand, and the employer, his uninjured workmen
and the consumers of his product, on the other hand, it is just
that the latter should pay compensation to the former. The
liability to pay that charge is placed in first instance upon the
employer, not essentially as a punishment to be suffered by him
Randolph, p. 55. (Italics mine.)
Cf. Faure. cit. Sagot. p. 88.
Sagot, p. 1o7.
'Report, Commissioiaer of Labor, p. xo3.
CN
f. Packer, p. 79; Taussig, "Principles of Political Economy", pp. 324-6.

'

JURISPRUDENCE OF WFORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 863

personally, but as a charge of production to be met by him as
would be any other new or increased charge. This additional
charge the employer may justly reckon among his other charges
of production in fixing his prices; but non constat that under all
conditions he can or should still pay his old wages and enjoy his
old profits and unload this item of expense altogether upon his
consumers. It is sufficient that the charge will be distributed
according to the natural laws of economics among those in the
community who profit by or enjoy the benefits of the industry,
instead of falling upon the victims of the industry.
But the hostile critics of the doctrine of trade risk insist:
"Distribution of the compensation charge among consumers . . . is to this theory so essential a corollary that
in France the charge is not imposable in domestic service,
as
because this is non-productive, or imposed in such vocations
the liberal professions, where it cannot well be passed on.""12
This is strange doctrine. In the economic sense employers
in domestic service are the consumers of the products of such
service, and consequently there is there no question of passing
on the charge; and the charge is not only "imposable" in domestic
service, but in Great Britain it is actually imposed therein. And
in the liberal professions the charge, if imposed, could be as
readily passed on as in productive industry. There were undoubtedly other motives, besides those hereinbefore enumerated 1811a for
limiting the scope of the compensation laws generally so as to
exclude domestic service and the liberal professions; but no evidence has been found that an idea that in those employments the
charge would fall on the wrong parties really determined that
result.
The hostile critics further insist that:
"If a law proceeding on the theory that industry should
bear the accident loss takes no account of the incidence of the
in respect of particular
burden it will lead to gross inequalities
trades and particular establishments.1 ' T
2

Randolph, pp. 33-4 (Italics mine.)

"aSupra, pp. 846-47.

' Randolph. p. 5.A
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This criticism is not aimed at the temporary hardships that
may result during the adjustment period after the first imposition of a compensation charge, nor at the possibility of an unfair
handicap in competition with foreign industries not burdened
with a like charge. Nor does it refer to the condition, vital to a
fair operation of the compensation law, that there must be available insurance at rates scaled fairly in proportion to risks. What
is objected to is that there may be particular enterprises and
industries that cannot bear the charge. Such a condition may
result where the accident cost of an enterprise is abnormal. If
such cost be abnormal in relation to the product, because of extraordinarily hazardous machinery, methods, processes or conditions,
the proprietor may be forced either to reduce his risks or to quit.
And if the product itself be so dangerous that it cannot be manufactured and sold for a price sufficient to cover the charge the
alternatives will be the same. Are such results unjust? The
advocates of the compensation law answer this question in the
negative, charging that such enterprises are "parasitic." Their
argument in support of this charge has been well stated by the
United States Supreme Court, as follows:13 8
"It is just and reasonable that if a person uses a dangerous
machine he should pay for the damage it occasions; if the
reward which he gains for the use of the machine will not pay
for the damage, it is mischievous to the public and ought to be
suppressed, for the loss ought not to be borne by the community
or the injured person. If the use of the machine is profitable
the owner ought to pay compensation for the damage."
Sociological Theories.
Turning to the sociological theories, we are not concerned
with the ancillary features and incidental methods of the various
compensation laws, but solely with the central feature common to
them all, namely, the employer's obligation to compensate for a
portion of the economic loss from occupational accidents.
The first feature to be noticed is that under the French and
British compensation laws the employer is deprived of full lib'St. Louis & S. F. R'y Co. v. Mathews. x6.s
U. S.
Powell v. Fall. q 0. B. D. .97. 6ot (i88o).

, 9 (1897), citing
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erty of contract, in as much as he is not allowed to contract out
of the liability imposed upon him. But similar restrictions upon
liberty of contract, dictated by reasons of public policy, are com139
mon to all jurisprudences.
Next, under all the compensation laws reviewed, the workmen are given some form of security for the payment of the compensation. Under the British law it is a preference in bankruptcy; under the French law, it is either a lien or an insurance of
the employer's solvency; and, under the German and Austrian
laws, it is full and direct insurance. Every such provision for security constitutes a class privilege, and implies a recognition of a
public interest in the welfare of the working-people.1 40 But security for payment is ancillary and not essential to the primary obligation-that of the employer to provide compensition-and does
not alter the nature of that primary obligation.
Equally non-essential is the fact that in Germany the compensation law is embodied in a highly bureaucratic system of
accident insurance, which in turn is intimately correlated with
other lines of insurance in a general system of social insurance
based expressly upon the doctrines of "state-socialism." But the
question remains whether the employer's obligation to provide
compensation through that insurance has not itself another and
a sociological basis besides the juridical idea of responsibility for
trade risk. Referring to the previous chapter upon the development of the German law it will be recalled that it originated in
a measure for workmen's insurance, to be maintained by taxes
and assessments, and based altogether upon the policy of statesocialism. That policy prevailed in the laws subsequently enacted for sickness insurance, invalidity insurance, etc.; but it did
not prevail entirely in the accident insurance. Into the successive
measures for that last named branch of the insurance the juridical idea of trade risk made progressive inroads. State subsidies
and employees' contributions were eliminated, the entire charge
for occupational accidents being placed upon the employers, nonoccupational accidents were excluded, and the rate of compensam

E. g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire,
7.

' Ancey. p.

219

U. S. 549 (1g1).
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tion was fixed according to the principles of the theory of trade
risk, without relation to the rates of benefits provided for other
misfortunes tinder the other insurances. Consequently the accident
insurance law has been generally claimed as a victory for the
idea of trade risk. Nevertheless the impress of state-socialism
remains, and gives to the employer's obligation under this law
something of a double basis.
What has just been said in large part applies also to the
Austrian law, which has followed the principles of the German
law.
There are those who contend that these accident compensation laws go beyond the limits of state-socialism in the direction
of radical socialism, because the state makes no contribution and
(except under the Austrian law) the entire burden is placed upon
the employing class.'I From the historical standpoint, at least,
this contention seems to be the reverse of the truth. For the
burden has been so placed in accordance with the doctrine of
trade risk, which is a juristic conception, identified with a school
of thought absolutely opposed to radical socialism.
It is a more subtle question than any of the preceding
whether the principle of trade risk itself is not based upon the
ideas of a new school of justice called "social justice." Characteristic of that school is the proposition that a private obligation
may be based upon a public duty, and yet be purely juridical and
free from any element of charity. 4 2 But the doctrine of trade
risk is not altogether identified with that school. What appears
to be the prevailing conception of its basis is indicated in the following words of Count de Mun:
"The agitation over work accidents arises from the sentiment, day by day more profound, of the duties and obligations
reldwhich result, for both employers and employees, from the 14
tions that are formed between them by the labor contract." '
In other words, the obligation to pay compensation is based
upon the idea of a duty owing from the employer to his injured
" Cf. Randolph, pp. 59-60.

'" Saleilles. cit. Bouyer. note p. iA6
3
Bonyer, p. 34.
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workman and not of a duty owed by the employer to society to
care for his workmen-although there may be also some such
duty as the latter.
VI. OBJECTIONS TO THE COMPENSATION LAW.

In conclusion the principal objections to and criticisms of
the compensation law will be noticed. It will be sufficient to outline briefly those relating to its principles and simply to indicate
the answers. But, for the convenience of the reader, to whom the
matters involved may be entirely unfamiliar, those relating to its
practical results will be more fully treated.
I. Jurisprudence recognizes only two grounds for private
legal obligations--contract and fault.
This objection to the principle of trade risk was vigorously
urged in France. 14' But as there used the word "jurisprudence"
means, not the science of law, but the settled law. If used in the
former sense the objection would be refuted by the existence
in the Roman Law of an open line of private obligations quasi ex
45
contractuA
The objection as raised in the United States is similarly qualified. Here it is contended that jurisprudence became fixed by
the adoption of the Bill of Rights in our constitutions in a form
that recognizes only contract or tort as a basis of liability. 146 No
support for the doctrine proclaimed in this objection can be found
in the Common Law, the spirit of which has always been peculiarly progressive and open to new principles1 " 7 It is not appropriate here to enter into the much mooted question of constitutionality. But to connect the matter of these pages with that
question, it is submitted that if the principle of trade risk, however novel and unknown at the time of the adoption of our constitutions, be soundly juridical, it is "due process of law" to base
a private obligation thereon.
'"Leon Say. Yves Guyot, and others, cit. Sagot, p. 55.
'"Cf. "Howe's Siudies.in Civil Law", 2d ed., pp. 269-270.
' Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 2oi N. Y. 271,293 (g);
contra, but perhaps obiter, Chicago Ry. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U. S. 582, s86 (go2); State
ex rel. Davis-Smith v. Clausen, 65 WVash. x56 (i9xi); Borgnis v. Falk, x47
Wise. 327 (1g1).
"

Hurtado v. California, tio U. S. 5z6, s3o-i (1894).
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2. "If the legislature can say to an employer, 'you must com-

pensate your employee for an injury not caused by you or by
your fault,' why can it not go further and say to the man of
wealth, 'you have more property than you need and your neighbor is so poor that he can barely exist; in the interest of natural
justice you must divide with your neighbor,'? . . .-149
The words italicized flagrantly beg the question by misrepresenting the Iav criticised. Under the compensation law
there is no liability unless there is a causal connection between the
accident and a risk reasonably incidental to the injured workman's employment. And, as we have seen, that law is based upon
a theory of employer's responsibility for the causation of that
risk. This theory of causation may be disputed, but its existence at the basis of the law may not be ignored.
An American commentator on social insurance also falls
into this error, contending that all question of responsibility for
causation is eliminated under the compensation law. He supports this contention by the assertion that under the laws of
France, Germany and Austria compensation is payable for "all
accidental injuries occurring during the time of the employment." 1491 How absolutely incorrect this assertion is has already
been shown. 14 1a Nevertheless it is worth while for emphasis, to
repeat the rule on this point, as correctly laid down by another
American commentator: The theory of the compensation law is
"that an industry should stand the cost of its own operation. It
makes no difference, according to this theory, whether the cost is
due to an injury to a workman or to the breaking or wearing out
of a machine..

.

. Further than this, however, no theory can

be justified which puts a liability upon an industry. A theory
justifying the imposition of a liability on an industry because the
injury is caused by that industry impliedly excludes liability for
all other injuries." 150
(Italics mine.)
'Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 2oi N. Y. 27r. 295 (Igi).
The inconsistency between this criticism and the fourth (infra, p. 48) should
be noted.
'Rubinow,

pp. xo3, II.

"'a Supra, pp. 848-49, 854, 857, 86t.
' C. P. Berry, "Central Law journal", January 23,

1914.
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3. The obligation imposed upon employers by the compensation law is such that it would expose the majority of them to a
constant peril of financial ruin, regardless of any degree of care
on their part, unless that peril be avoided by insurance. Consequently the law presumes insurance. Therefore what the law
establishes is essentially a political system of distributing an economic loss, and the obligation it imposes upon employers is
per se not just.
The premises of this criticism are true. The compensation
law does presume insurance for its proper operation. "If it has
the trade risk for its point of departure, the . . . law has also
as point of arrival the realization of insurance." 1'5 Insurance
totalizes the losses, distributes them among a number of persons
and throughout a number of years, and thus renders them more
regular and less disturbing. More scientifically stated, insurance.if correctly administered, converts the liability into a fixed charge
fairly proportionate to the risk. 152 It is, therefore, not only desirable in order to secure the workmen, but also necessary for the
proper distribution of the charge.
But from these premises does the conclusion of the criticism
follow? Is a legal obligation unjust because, for its proper
operation, it requires of those upon whom it is imposed an ordinary and usual business precaution? Does applied law deal with
abstractions or with realities?
This criticism comes with peculiarly bad. grace from the
advocates of the old system of liability, since that system also
exposed employers to an almost equal peril of financial ruin practically-although not theoretically-regardless of any degree of
care on their part, unless they protected themselves by insurance.
In fact the situation of the industrial employer is identical under
both l.ws, except as to the cost of the charge for insurance.
Nevertheless there are many believers in the principle of
trade risk who accept the conclusion of this criticism. They argue
that the state cannot stop short with the imposition of the obligation; it must go further and provide the insurance. The thesis of
" Paulet, cit. Ancey, p. 6.
So Cf. Ancey, p. 38.
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the German accident insurance system is that "it is necessary to
provide the employers with the assurance of absolute security,
which can only be done by institutions having the guatantee of
the Government; in addition it must provide the cheapest kind of
insurance possible, which can only be done by eliminating the element of profit.1 5 3 This, however, is jumping to most doubtful
conclusions. Is governmentally provided insurance, in one rigid
form, even with a state guarantee and with profits eliminated,
the most desirable? Or, on the other hand, can employers provide insurance for themselves better than politicians can do it
for them? State socialists insist upon the former view; whereas
all who believe in private initiative insist upon the latter. Those
who hold the latter view contend that all that the state need do
in this connection is to supervise and regulate compensation insurance as other insurance is supervised and regulated, and to protect employers from the possibility of a monopoly.
4. An object of the compensation laws was to reduce litigation. But "the theory of trade risk multiplies litigation instead
of avoiding it." "In order to determine a causal connection
between the accident and a risk of employment it is necessary
generally to undertake a minute examination of the facts. Thus,
by the application of its principle, this law leads back to the endiess disputes over pure questions of fact that characterized the
old law."'1 54
This criticism hits the German law, under which the burden
of litigation for employers appears to have become heavier than
ever.1 55 The statistics of that litigation are truly appalling. In
1912 there were 421,855 awards by the accident insurance associations, open to litigation. From these awards there were 70,023
appeals to the arbitration tribunals. And from the decisions of
those tribunals there were.22,827 appeals to the higher insurance
offices."" This abnormal quantity of litigation, however, is not
attributable to the substantive provisions of the law, but to its
' Report, Commissioner
' Morin, p. 89.
' Cf. Serre, p. 397.

m Villard, V. 34.

of Labor, p. 98&
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administrative features, and particularly to the fact that from
political motives appeals have been made free to the workmen
and encouraged. Moreover, only an infinitesimal proportion of
this litigation turns upon the question of causal connection between the accident and a risk of the employment. The principal

subjects of dispute are the existence of disability, the degree of
the disability, the connection between the disability and the accident, and the amount of the compensation-subjects that would

give rise to an equal proportion of disputes under any criterion of
liability.
British experience, ofi the other hand, demonstrates that a
compensation law may reduce litigation to a minimum.

In 1912,

the British law applied to about sixteen millions of workingpeople. There were 417,694 cases of compensation, of which
384,798 were fiew cases. There was litigation in only ui,o4.
cases. Of these litigated cases, 3o16 were settled out of court or
withdrawn, 1639 were applications dealing with allowances
already granted, 459 were applications for apportionment of
agreed compensation among dependents, and 46 were old cases
under the Act of 1897, unclassified, leaving only 5858 as the
number of new cases between employer and-employee settled by
the courts. Consequently there was litigation in only about one
and one-half pcr cent. of the new cases. As to "industrial"
accidents the proportion was still lower, being twenty-eight per
cent. of the fatal cases and four-tenths of one per cent. of the
non-fatal cases.1 51 Moreover, litigation under this law is much
less burdensome, expensive and prolonged than under the old
liability law. In the courts of first instance trials are prompt
and informal, the more complex issues of fact being determined.
out of court by medical referees, and the costs are regulated to
bear very lightly'upon the workmen. Appeals, however, are not
much privileged and consequently. are avoided. In 1912 only
212 cases were appealed to the intermediate courts of appeal,
and only six cases were carried to the final court of appeal, the
House of Lords. The principal issues involved in the litigatioh
."An intensive study of the fatal cases leads to the conclusion that a high
-atio of litigation therein is humanly speaking unavoidable for many reasons.
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are the same as in Germany. It is true that a large proportion
of the reported cases turn on the question whether the a'cident
"arose out of and in the course of the employment." But the
reported cases are the appealed cases only; and that question,
although so prominent in the appealed cases, is not the issue in
any large proportion of the litigated cases and appears not to be
a cause of dispute in much more than one or two claims out of
a thousand.
5. In industrial life it is vital that the law sho.uld develop
a sense of personal responsibility., 8 But in this respect the compensation laws have failed, as is evidenced by a large and constantly progressive increase in the industrial accident rate under
their operations.
"The theory of trade risk has an immoral side in presenting
accidents as the inevitable consequences of business." "It exaggerates the fatalism of accidents, the tendency to take them for
granted too readily, to think that there is nothing to do but to pay
59
the compensation or the insurance premium."'
"The theory of risk, while admissible under certain conditions, has perhaps been exaggerated. A rea tion has commenced.
Ve are beginning to take into account that the danger of this
doctrine is not only in predicating the right to reparation upon
a too exclusive preoccupation with social utility, but this utility
itself is not always, accurately estimated. In diminishing forethought and the care for responsibility, is there not a sacrifice
of the interests we are pretenling to protect?"'160
"There is no doubt but that accidents are rendered more frequent by relieving from responsibility those whose imprudences
give rise to them."" '
Studying this line of criticism we must distinguish carefully
between the consequences of the application of. the principles of
trade risk and the consequences of not applying them.
In the first place: It cannot rationally be claimed that the
theory of trade risk tends to eliminate tne idea of respoiisibility
' Bouyer,p. z63.

' Hauriou, cit. 2 Randolph, p. 35
2 Randolph, p. 36.
'Colson, "Organisme Economique et Desordre Social", pp. 153-4.

"' Charnont, cit.
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for risks, because it has itself, as it were, invented the idea of
responsibility for the largest class of risks, theusual and ordinary
risks of a business, for which, according to the theory of law it
supplanted, nobody was responsible. And the charge that the
application of this theory has tended to produce a sense of the
inevitableness of the great mass of accidents, a sense that the
risks of industry cannot be reduced, is disproved by the generally
admitted fact that the very first and most immediate result of the
compensation laws has been to cause industrial employers most
materially to reduce the physical hazards of their enterprises.
The fault, therefore, if any, does not lie in the basic theory of
the compensation laws, but must be found in some one or more of
their practical features.
The feature of those laws which first presents itself as a
possible subject for this criticism, is their extension, for purely
practical reasons, to cover accidents not due to the trade risk but
to personal faults. In this respect it is an open question whether
some or all of those laws have not gone too far.16 2 But as re-.
gards the prevention of accidents the weight of opinion'Qf industrial experts seems to be. decidedly in favor of'such extensions,
provided that compensation be allowed only for accidents occurring to workmen while acting within the scope of their respective
employments,, as is the rule under the laws we have reviewed.
Even admitting the worst for this practice, it may be a wise
choice between two evils; because the old law produced a condition, either of employers' general irresponsibility oT of chaotic
uncertainty as to responsibility, which, as regards accident prevention, was infinitely the worse. Moreover, it is argued that
the division of the economic loss from each and every accident
must in some degree tend to produce among employers and employees a sense of joint responsibility for accidents as well as a
joint interest in their prevention. And the validity of this argument is not impaired by the fact that the accident rate is increasing, for the reason that the defective formulas adopted in the lawe
for defining the rate of compensation do not divide the loss for
every accident, but in a high proportion of accident cases give
,uSchwedtman &Emery, . 29.
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the workmen approximately full indemnity, and in a smaller bit
yet material proportion give them a profit. 163 If then among the
working-people there-is to be noted an increasing sense of irresponsibility, it may be fairly argued that it is attributable to this
failurev to apply the principles of trade risk rather than to their
application.
Some commentators assert that the principles of the accident compensation and insurance laws eliminate all idea of responsibility for causation,' and, if followed to their logical conclusion, "must entirely do away with any vestige of the old principles of fault";165 and that the rate of compensation is based
upon "needs"-i. e., the needs of the injured workman and his
family-and not upon "loss." ' 6 And they emphasize the inevitableness of accidents.1 67 Such commentators, however, are not
exponents of the principles of trade risk, which theory they repudiate,1 68 but of the doctrines of democratic socialism; and their
views of these laws are palpably heterodox.
In the second place: Although statistics show an alarming
increase in the accident rate tnder the compensation laws,1 69 yet
it is a mistake to jump to general conclusions theref om. For
an analysis of the.detailed figures brings out the facts that the
rate of accidents ascribed to employers' faults is decreasing, and
that the rate of najor accidents--of fatal and serious*caseshas remained fairly constant, which is an improvement over previous conditions. Consequently the increase is solely in the rate
of minor injuries, and, if it be attributable to indifference at all,
such increased indifference is solely on the part of the workmen.
Moreover the increase indicated in the accident rate has been
Ruegg, p. 537.
.Rubinow, p. io4.
'id., p. 133.
'nCf.

'

'"Id., pp. 124, 133.
"Id., pp. 82-83.
'-Id., p. Iis.
" In Germany from 30.28. per ooo workmen covered, in 189o to 52.83
in i011t
; in France from 6.1.4 in 1901 to 87.2 in i01o; in Great Britain from
45.5 in 19o9 to r7.S in ioi.3; and in ustria from io.s in M80t to 16.9g in
191i.
The figures for the different countries are computed upon different
bases and are not mutually comparable.
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more apparent than real.

In the first years uinder the operations

of the compensation laws it was principally attributable to improvement in the reporting of accidents, and of later years it has
'been attributable principally to an increasing disposition to claim

disability by accident without any real increase in injuries. Consequently the real increase in the rate of injuries by accident is
very much less than the statistics indicate. And some of that
increase is probably due to the increasing speed of machines and
machinery, and to a lowering of the working-class level of ability
brought about by a higher proportion of women and foreigners
in industry. Consequently, in final analysis; it appears certain
that the increase in the accident rate attributable to indifference
or a sense of the inevitableness of accidents, is much less, of less
serious consequence, and more specialized, than would naturally
be inferred from the statistical summaries.1 70
Nevertheless it must be admitted that the 'arious abuses
that have arisen under the compensation laws are slowly sapping
the sense of responsibility on the part of the working-people, and
that the criticism under consideration has the merit of calling attention to the dangerous aptitude of these laws to perversion and
abuse.
P. Tecumseh Sherman.
New York City.
'"The writer believes that a properly framed compensation law is an
efficient regulation for accident prevention. But space forbids any consideration of that aspect of the subject.

